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Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer
By ERIC SCHNAPPER
I
All litigation presents to some degree, real though not always perceived,
a conflict between each attorney's responsibility as a representative of his or
her client and as an officer of the court. Winning the case and seeing that justice is done must be inconsistent goals for counsel on at least one side in a case,
if not on both. However substantial this problem may be regarded, it is certainly more complex for counsel for the government. Unlike a private attorney subject to dismissal for ignoring a client's wishes, counsel for the government often has, subject to the variables of intragovernmental relations, the
power to take a course of action or accept a settlement contrary to the wishes
of the agency officials involved. In addition, government counsel owes some
arguable duty to the opposing party, not only as a citizen and taxpayer of
the entity for which he or she works, but also because that party seeks to invoke the same laws as those which he or she is committed, in theory if not by
oath, to enforce. The relationship of agency officials to government counsel
is not that of client and attorney in any ordinary sense, for the identities and
desires of those officials may vary with popular opinion, the vote of the electorate, or the whims of their superiors, while the law to which both officials
and counsel owe their allegiance remains unaltered.
Although attitudes on this problem vary significantly among and within
government law offices, the general practice of government counsel seems to
be to refrain from making any independent judgment on the merits of the
agency's position, or to argue for that position even when the lawyer believes
it is wrong.
Three related explanations are commonly advanced by government attorneys for resolutely defending whatever conduct, or advancing whatever claim,
the agency involved may prefer. It is urged that the agency is entitled to a
lawyer, that the agency's theory or argument should be ruled on by a court
rather than by government counsel, and that no harm can come of pressing
the agency's case since the courts will ultimately resolve the matter correctly.
While legitimate considerations underlie each of these contentions, none is
sufficient to absolve counsel for the government from his or her responsibility
to scrutinize the validity of the conduct or contention he or she is asked to
defend in court.
The suggestion that government bodies are entitled to counsel has a heady
Sixth Amendment ring to it, but there is less here than meets the eye.The
issue at the outset is not a right to counsel, but a right to unlimited free representation by counsel with the prestige and resources of an attorney general's
Editor's Note: The author, a member of the Association, is an assistant counsel of
the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. The views expressed are
his own.
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or corporation counsel's office. No one denies the right of a public employee
to retain private counsel and litigate in his or her own name any legal theory,
however fanciful, he or she may favor, subject to establishing the requisite
standing. Whether such special counsel should be provided at public expense
depends on whether, to use an 'admittedly troublesome phrase, the "real
party" is the state or city or merely a whimsical or lawless public employee.
See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1907). If a public employee were sued for
insisting his or her subordinates make political contributions, no responsible government attorney would defend the employee's right to do so, recognizing that that conduct was palpably illegal. If, on the other hand, the
employee were sued for seeking to enforce a duly adopted prohibition against
soliciting contributions in the office, a publicly funded defense would be in
order. The decision whether an agency or official is "entitled" to government counsel seems to turn on whether the disputed conduct in fact represents public policy, bearing in mind that even the policies of a high official
are not public policies if in violation of public law, or the private whims of
one or more government employees. Thus, this line of reasoning provides no
foundation for a general obligation on the part of government counsel to
represent the views of agency officials, but merely supports a duty to represent agency officials when they are right.
The second argument does have some independent weight. In our adversary system courts are created for resolving disputes of law and legally significant disputes of fact, and are frequently an optimal forum for doing so.
Any action which cuts off such contentions from reaching the courts prevents
the mode of resolution generally regarded as most fair and definitive. It is
also true, however, that in large organizations, public and private, specific
procedures and bureaus are established for the express purpose of screening
from among contentions of organization employees those which will and will
not be presented to the courts. An insurance company representative may
believe a particular claim is frivolous or untimely, but his or her desire to
reject that claim and force it to litigation may be overridden by his or her
supervisors or legal department. Such a decision does not offend us because
we see the right to decide whether to litigate such a case as being that of the
organization as such, rather than that of the particular employee who may
know and care the most about it. The existence of a legitimate interest in
seeing an issue resolved in court does not depend on the merit or arguable
frivolousness of the issue, but is a function of who within the government
wants that resolution. The desire of a governor or mayor would bring this
interest into play, but the wishes of a clerk in the Motor Vehicle Department
would not; the circumstances presented by actual cases will ordinarily fall
somewhere in between. This proffered justification of current practice, that
a defendant agency is entitled to a court decision as to the legality of a challenged practice, is manifestly inconsistent with the systematic assertion of
defenses, all too often insubstantial, intended to prevent a decision on the
merits: lack of jurisdiction, immunity, abstention, comity, statutes of limitations or the Eleventh Amendment.
The argument that litigation can be cavalierly and endlessly pursued on
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behalf of public agencies without social cost is manifestly unsound. Any litigation places burdens on the opposing side, which, unlike the state officials,
usually is not receiving free representation, and that often irreparable burden seems progressively less conscionable as the state or city contention becomes less substantial. In many cases continued litigation will entail a delay
in the awarding of necessary relief. If in these cases the private party prevails
on the merits, the public policy and thus true state interest will have been
found to be on its side, and thus to have suffered because of continued representation of the views of one or more public employees. An attorney general
or corporation counsel, moreover, is no ordinary lawyer; his or her involvement on one side of a controversy can lend sufficient weight or prestige to
influence the outcome of a close case. Conversely, if such a public law office
acquires a reputation in the courts of obstinately defending or prosecuting
every action regardless of its import or merit, the office's ability to effectively
present meritorious contentions is likely to be impaired. The widely varying
attitudes towards their responsibility to constituent agencies and the law is
partially responsible for the different weight accorded by the Supreme Court
to the views of the Solicitor General and state attorneys general.
State law generally recognizes the power of government counsel to control
litigation. In New York, for example, section 63() of the Executive Law
provides that the Attorney General shall "prosecute and defend all actions
and proceedings in which the state is interested, and have charge and control
of all the legal business of the departments and bureaus of the state." The
New York statute was adopted at the turn of the century, not to force the
Attorney General to resolutely prosecute every claim and adamantly defend
every action, but to assure that the authority for deciding whether to defend,
prosecute, or settle was in the hands of the Attorney General rather than of
the interested agency. Under a statute such as this, an attorney general clearly
has the authority to settle a case against the desires of agency officials, abandoning a claim he or she believes is not meritorious or agreeing to an injunction against practices he or she believes unlawful. Whether, and if so when,
an attorney general should do so is less clear. The language of section 630 )
suggests the Attorney General's client is "the state"; whether "the state" is
to be equated with the constitution and laws of New York, as construed by
the Attorney General, with the desires or whims of agency officials, or with
something in between, is not clear on the face of the statute. Section 71 of
the Executive Law obligates the Attorney General under certain special circumstances to "appear ...in support of the constitutionality" of a challenged
state statute. Since no such express obligation exists regarding a challenge
to the legality or constitutionality of agency actions or regulations, it would
be difficult to read section 63(1) to require the sort of adamant defense contemplated by section 71. But while §71 seems fairly unambiguous, laying
aside the question of whether the Attorney General should seek to uphold the
statute by construing the statute or by construing the constitution, compliance
could in some cases be inconsistent with Article 13, section i of the state constitution, which requires the Attorney General to swear to "support the
constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of New
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York," a requirement mandated in part by Article VI of the United States
constitution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility unambiguously asserts that attorneys for public bodies have an obligation to make and enforce an independent judgment as to the merits of government claims or defenses. Ethical
Consideration 7-11 states that service as a "government lawyer" may affect
the responsibilities of an attorney. EC 7-13 spells out a number of specific
obligations of prosecutors, noting that their ultimate duty is "to seek justice,
not merely to convict." EC 7-14 provides:
A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that
is obviously unfair .... A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice and to
develop a full and fair record, and he should not use his position or
the economic power of the government to harass parties or to bring
about unjust settlements or results.
This rule extends to civil litigation the admonition of old Canon 5 that a
public prosecutor's "primary duty" is "to see that justice is done." Since
these obligations fall upon government counsel, rather than agency officials,
it is that counsel who must assess what justice requires in each case and
implement that assessment. This rule could be read literally to require each
government attorney to act as an intermediate judge, deciding the merit of
an agency's or official's claim, on the law and facts, and without an adversary
procedure, before presenting any position in court; the rule could also be
largely emasculated to mean only that government counsel should press
every case until a court handed down a decision it thought just.
The exercise of some independent judgment by counsel for a state or city
is clearly necessary because of the absence of the traditional restraints which
ordinarily curb a party's inclination to undue litigiousness. In private litigation each party's decision to initiate, continue, or settle is based on weighing,
inter alia, the possible outcome of the case against the cost of litigation; a
private party will not normally spend $2o,ooo to prosecute or defend a
$5,ooo claim and its willingness to bear any costs will depend on its judgment as to the substantiality of the claim at issue. A government agency,
however, usually receives unlimited free representation, and faces no such
costs. Frequently, particularly outside of small towns, the agency that is the
party and the agency responsible for conducting the litigation are so detached that officials of the former may be relatively indifferent to whether
they are wasting the time of officials of the latter. The availability of free
representation gives the government agency a substantial advantage over a
private litigant, one which may be augmented by governmental investigative
resources. A degree of restraint to avoid oppression is particularly appropriate because the provisions of EC 7-14 and Canon 5 derive from earlier rules
intended to offset the special advantages enjoyed by public prosecutors in
England.
The underlying dispute in private litigation is often about money alone,
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and the significance of injunctive relief will usually be weighed in terms of
its economic impact, so that a balancing of these costs with that of litigation
is relatively straightforward. In public litigation, on the other hand, injunctive relief may be sought or opposed by the agency involved because of its
impact on public policy or on the desires of agency officials. However unlikely it may be that a Department of Social Services will care about the cost
of several months of an Attorney General's time tied up in trying a $5,000
tort claim, that calculation is certainly one that could be made with relative
ease; it is far more difficult to know how much it is "worth" to defend the
right of a warden to use undersized cells or solitary confinement. Even where
only money is at stake, its significance may be assessed differently by a public
agency than by a private party primarily concerned with profits or solvency.
A public official might be adamant, perhaps properly, to pursue at any cost a
small judgment in order to vindicate his or her sense of justice or to "protect
the taxpayers"; on the other hand, a course of conduct, including a refusal to
settle, leading to an adverse million dollar judgment is far more likely to
concern, and lead to adverse personal consequences for, the officials involved
if the losing party is a private corporation rather than a city. In the absence
of the usual checks and balances, a determined agency employee might well
insist on litigating to the last assistant attorney general a claim or defense
which a private party would readily abandon or compromise. Counsel for the
government must establish policies for the conduct of public litigation which
will to some degree offset those missing constraints, although not necessarily
in the same cases or to the same degree as would have been the case in private
litigation.
The difficulty of ascertaining the responsibility of counsel for a government body is somewhat more complex when that counsel, as in the case of
an elected attorney general, is not chosen by an official of the executive
branch. The very purpose of providing for the election of such legal counsel
is to assure their independence from other elected and appointed officials.
While that special independence may be particularly important in carrying
out a criminal or civil investigation of misconduct by other government
employees, it is also relevant to an attorney's resolution of an apparent conflict between state law and the disputed actions or policies of a state or local
official. Conversely, a decision by an elected attorney general to settle litigation against the wishes of the defendant officials will, under ordinary circumstances, be binding on them, a consequence which compels caution. Indeed,
in some cases such a decision could impose a settlement on an unwilling
mayor or governor. Appointed legal counsel, on the other hand, subject to
being overruled on such a decision by an appointing mayor or governor, may
properly feel a greater degree of freedom to recommend a particular resolution of litigation and leave the final decision to authorities higher than both
themselves and the defendant officials. The difference between appointed
and elected counsel, however, is one of degree, for the amount of independence traditionally accorded to an appointed attorney general or corporation counsel may be so great as to render conclusive his or her views as
to the proper resolution of a particular case; within the federal government,
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for example, the judgment of the Attorney General on the conduct of litigation is not ordinarily appealed to or questioned by the President, whereas in
a small town the corporation counsel may consult with the mayor on a daily
basis about fairly routine legal issues, much in the manner of a private counsel and client.
To note, as does the Executive Law, that an Attorney General's client is
the state, is not to explain such a lawyer's responsibilities, but merely to rephrase the question. Neither "the state" nor "the city" live and breathe as
a natural person, they do not have hopes and fears, their interests cannot be
assessed in the way one assesses those of an individual or corporation, and
they cannot be called on the phone and asked to make a decision. Agency
officials bear a beguilingly superficial resemblance to an ordinary client, and
they are usually willing to play that role, albeit, for the reasons noted, in a
special and not altogether salutary way. But while public officials naturally
equate their own desires and interests with those of the state or city, that is
not a mistake which counsel for the government should make. The fundamental and controlling expression of the policies and purposes of a government body are to be found not in the speeches of its officials or in intra-agency
memorandums, but in the statutes and applicable constitutional or charter
provisions. By virtue of the Supremacy Clause the federal constitution and
laws also define those policies and purposes. It is the law, and not the whims
of persons momentarily in the employment of the executive branch, which
embodies the interests and desires of the client whom a government attorney
is retained to represent. Where the law is in conflict with the actions or policies of any individual, the responsibility of a government attorney is to represent the views of his or her client expressed through that law, regardless of
whether the individual at odds with it is a governor, mayor, minor bureaucrat, private citizen, or common criminal. See EC 5-18.
II
Ascertaining the responsibility of a government attorney would be relatively easy if the law and facts in every disputed case were crystal clear at the
outset, But such cases, to the perennial consternation of the bench and enrichment of the bar, are rare. In most litigation a good faith dispute may
exist as to either the applicable law or the relevance, significance or existence
of evidence. In such a situation government counsel may start with as little
predisposition as a judge on the disputed issues, but, unlike a judge, counsel
cannot await a full trial of the dispute before he or she takes action, but must
decide at the outset what role to play. As law and facts become progressively
less clear, the desires of agency officials become more relevant to counsel's
position. Even granted the duty of counsel to impose on agency officials a
settlement contrary to their wishes, counsel ought, if only in the interest of
the adversary process, enter such dispute with a presumption in favor of those
officials. Whether known evidence or clear legal requirements are such as to
overcome that presumption is a question of degree, and the circumstances
under which that problem must be resolved vary widely.
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The law with which an agency's conduct or claims may be in conflict may
be a mere regulation or guideline, local ordinance, city charter, state statute,
state constitution, or federal statute, regulation, or constitutional provision.
The more remote the agency officials from the framing and adoption of the
law involved, the less relevant their views as to what it may require. Thus,
an attorney in the Tax Division of the Department of Justice might properly, in fashioning the Department's position in a tax case, give far greater
heed to the views of IRS as to the meaning of a regulation or a statute recently adopted at the agency's behest than to its position as to whether its
investigative methods violated the Fifth Amendment. Some distinction also
seems appropriate between laws establishing procedures and those creating
substantive rights, since the fashioning of agency procedures is a matter in
which agencies have traditionally been accorded a significant role, and because violations of procedures often may be of less importance to the law's
values than a violation of a substantive rule, such as the First Amendment.
That is not the case, however, where adherence to the proper procedures
might well have led to significantly different substantive results.
Disputes of fact are likely to present questions as to both the existence of
evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. A government prosecutor
has an affirmative constitutional obligation to disclose facts favorable to his
opponent, and a government attorney certainly has the same ethical obligation in civil litigation. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Government counsel's responsibility with regard to arguing inferences probably depends in part on the relevance of the factual dispute. If the legal requirements are clear and the only dispute as to whether or not the agency's, or its
opponent's, actions were consistent therewith, government counsel clearly
have a duty to make an independent judgment as to what actually occurred;
if an agency official is in fact violating the law, the state or city would have
no interest in obscuring that fact. Where facts are relevant to the determination of whether admitted conduct was lawful, such as whether a height requirement for policemen is sufficiently business-related as to render it lawful
under Title VII despite the resulting exclusion of women or Puerto Ricans,
government counsel can more properly give weight to the views of the agency
involved. Independent of the relevance of such facts, government counsel
has a greater obligation than that of private counsel to scrutinize the veracity
and accuracy of evidence to be submitted on behalf of his or her client, especially when it consists of self-serving testimony by agency officials. While
counsel may in some instances be able to weigh the merits of legal claims at
the outset of a case, in other situations an independent judgment on the facts
may have to be deferred until the completion of discovery or trial, especially
since only then will counsel have the advantage of learning the testimony
of opposing witnesses and of hearing the testimony of agency witnesses under
oath and subject to vigorous cross-examination.
Some significance may attach to whether the relief sought in a case is monetary or injunctive. A dispute as to how much a public or private defendant
owes will usually not involve the important public policies that may be at stake
regarding the issue of liability. But the mere fact that money is at stake does
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not absolve government counsel from a duty to make any independent judgments, for the government exists not to declare dividends but to carry out
the policies embodied in the laws involved. Whether the amount of money
to be paid or recovered in a case involves important public policies, such as
making whole the victims of job discrimination, or merely monetary interests,
such as providing compensation for an automobile accident involving a state
car, will determine government counsel's freedom to act like an attorney for
a private litigant.
Finally, it must be noted that government counsel has alternatives to either
arguing whatever position is preferred by agency officials or asserting a view
or agreeing to a settlement contrary to their wishes. An attorney general believing a view erroneous but entitled to consideration in court can seek to
arrange for that view to be presented by special outside counsel or agency
house counsel; in such a case the attorney general could take no position or
perhaps file an amicus brief against the agency. Government counsel can
choose to present an argument expressly explained to be an agency contention on which counsel takes no position. Where the agency has taken a posi-

tion government counsel believes unsound, but there are other parties in the
litigation prepared to defend it, counsel enjoys some freedom to decline to
take a stand on the issue. If the position of an attorney general's or corporation counsel's office is subject to ultimate control by a governor or mayor, an
attorney who believes the position taken to be erroneous can and usually
should decline to have his or her name placed on the brief involved. Each of
these responses serves to protect for other cases the independence and stature
of an attorney general's or corporation counsel's office and provides a method
short of the more drastic step of imposing a settlement for putting pressure
on agency officials to reconsider a questionable stance.
Cases in which counsel represents a government agency or a government
employee sued in his or her official capacity must be distinguished from those
in which government counsel represents a government employee sued in his
or her private capacity for monetary relief. In the latter situation the city
or state does not have a direct interest, but often chooses to provide free legal
services to government employees in order to avoid the chilling effect on
them of the fear or cost of defending such litigation. See Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974). On its face such representation is similar to private liti-

gation and does not present the difficulties discussed above. Three different
ethical problems, however, can arise from the fact that the attorney for a
defendant mayor or policeman actually is paid by the government. First,
that free representation will not be available for all actions against all government employees, but will depend on the circumstances of the case and
the policies of the corporation counsel or attorney general. Thus counsel may
be provided to a police officer charged with a tort in the arrest of a suspect,
but not for a tortious beating of his mother-in-law. Whether the facts fall
within the category of cases in which counsel is provided may be unclear at
the outset of a case, but withdrawal of counsel in the middle of a case is
properly frowned upon by the Code of Professional Responsibility because
of the hardship it can cause the client. See EC 2-31. In many cases, however,
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the defendant official will have personal knowledge of the relevant facts, and
the legitimate interests of both client and counsel could ordinarily be balanced by expressly conditioning representation on complete and accurate
disclosure by the client. If the client lies about what occurred in order to induce government counsel to represent him or her, he or she cannot complain
if discovery of that misrepresentation leads to withdrawal of counsel.
Second, a conflict of interest will frequently arise where the official and the
agency itself are co-defendants represented by a single government lawyer
and the legal or factual basis or extent of their liability differs. In a police
brutality case in which the victim sues both the police officer and the city,
for example, defense counsel clearly acts against the interest of the individual defendant by moving to dismiss the action against the city on grounds
of sovereign immunity. That conflict can, as a practical matter, be avoided
if the city has a policy of indemnifying the individual defendant, but that is
not always the case. Third, where the complaint alleges conduct that is or
may be criminal, government counsel, even though not a prosecutor, would
normally have an obligation to report any suspected crimes to his employer,
and thus faces yet another conflict of interest. In a police brutality case, for
example, the evidence, or more troublingly the revelations of the individual client, may indicate the occurrence of a criminal assault or even murder
by the officer. In either of these latter situations representation of both the
government and the individual would, by ordinary standards, clearly be
improper, since the two clients clearly have "different interests." See Disciplinary Rule 5 -1o 5 (A). The individual defendant, however, may prefer
even such equivocal representation to no representation at all, or to representation paid for from his or her own funds, but a preference born of such
economic pressures is not a meaningful voluntary waiver of the individual's
right to independent and vigorous counsel. The proper resolution of these
difficulties is to provide for expressly separate representation of both the individual's and the government's interests, in which counsel for the individual,
even though paid by the government, would, like a public defender, understand his or her loyalty was solely to the individual. Where possible the attorney providing that independent representation should do so on a full-time
basis, rather than switching his or her loyalties case by case. Such a procedure
will have the salutary effect of helping the corporation counsel or attorney

general to bear in mind the difference between the desires and interests of the
government and of individual agency officials, and to make more deliberate
decisions as to when and whether to represent the latter.
III
While many cases will pose difficult questions regarding the extent to
which government counsel should make and enforce on the officials involved
an independent judgment on the merits of a case, some general rules can be
divined.
Government counsel should be adamant in insisting that agency officials
disclose all relevant facts and documents to counsel, the court, and the op-
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posing party. The obstruction or delay of discovery serves no legitimate state

or city interest, and merely assists recalcitrant officials to break the laws counsel is obligated to enforce. This standard, however plausible on its face,
has in the past followed with particular infrequency because compliance
requires government counsel to do a great deal of work, responding to written interrogatories, searching through files, or preparing for and attending
depositions. Even if merely due to overwork or laziness, such interference
with full disclosure prevents the vindication of a state's or city's interest in a
proper resolution of the litigation.
Similar care must be used in advancing factual explanations or justifications for challenged agency conduct. Counsel must not accept and pass on
without scrutiny assertions by agency officials in this regard, but should either
make an independent determination of the facts or forward the agency
contention as theirs alone. This is particularly important in offering a rational or compelling basis for a statute alleged to violate the federal or state
constitution.
Great restraint should be exercised in advancing arguments designed to
terminate litigation on a ground other than the merits. Particularly in defending government agencies, the successful assertion of such arguments will
result, not in assuring that state or city policy is implemented, but in assisting
officials to do whatever they please even though it may be squarely contrary
to applicable law. Ordinarily such defenses should not be offered except in
two situations: where a jurisdictional defect is sufficiently clear that a court
would be obligated to act sua sponte and where a statute of limitations defense affects only monetary liability devoid of public policy significance.
A special problem arises when the validity of a statute or ordinance is
challenged. While the views of an administrative official may be of little consequence in establishing the policies and desires of counsel's real client, the
enactment of a legislature or city council are in a very important sense an
expression of that client's views, even if arguably inconsistent with another
and overriding expression in a constitution or city charter. The timing of
events is of importance, since the policies of the present legislature or council must be looked to in assessing the significance to be attached to the policy
expressed in the challenged law or ordinance. If, for example, the measure
was adopted prior to an intervening Supreme Court decision rendering it
presumptively invalid, and there is no reason to believe it would be enacted
anew were the council or legislature aware of that decision, a concession of
invalidity seems appropriate. Conversely, if the measure was adopted in defiance of such a decision and against the advice of the attorney general or
corporation counsel, he or she could properly step aside and insist the council or legislature provide for special counsel to defend it. The obligation to
defend a borderline enactment is particularly great when it was adopted in
good faith to test the limits of the council's or legislature's constitutional
authority.
No simple answer or formula can be established for deciding when government counsel should impose a position or settlement contrary to the wishes
of agency officials. Some of the key factors to be considered can, however, be
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delineated: the clarity of the law, whether the law involved is substantive or
procedural, the burden of continued litigation on the opposing party and
on the vindication of the legal principles involved, and the importance of the
substantive law at stake. What is essential is that a deliberate and informed
decision be made by counsel for the government, after a thorough examination of the facts and legal issues involved, that that decision be reopened
when new circumstances come to light, and that the pattern of these decisions be monitored to assure that they are in fact being made on a reasonably
appropriate basis.

